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1956] RECENT DECISIONS 703 
CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDERS-USE OF CORPORATE FUNDS FOR PROXY CON-
TEST EXPENSES-Following a proxy contest in which the insurgent faction of 
stockholders was successful, the new board of directors paid out $28,000 to 
members of the old board to cover expenses incurred by them, and also used 
$127,000 to reimburse the prevailing group. The latter expenditure was 
approved by a sixteen-to-one majority vote of the stockholders. Plaintiff 
brought a derivative action seeking restoration of both amounts. The trial 
court dismissed the complaint, and the appellate division affirmed this judg-
ment.1 On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, three 
judges dissenting. Corporate diectors may make reasonable expenditures in 
connection with proxy contests which involve issues of policy, and stock-
holders may reimburse successful contestants for similar expenses. Each 
allegedly improper expenditure must be challenged specifically. Rosenfeld 
v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., (N.Y. 1955) 128 N.E. (2d) 291. 
Against a background of proxy contests which approached the intensity 
and expense of political campaigns,2 the judges of the New York Court of 
Appeals, in a three-way opinion, added their views to those previously ex-
pressed as to the propriety of defraying such expenses with corporate funds. 
It is settled that management may draw upon the corporate treasury for 
certain costs incident to obtaining proxies when policy matters3 are at issue.4 
10 See Bicks and Friedman, "Regulation of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Mis-
guided Morality," 28 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 975 (1953). 
11 Id. at 995. 
704 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 54 
Mailing of proxy forms, providing for their retum,5 and publication of 
newspaper notices of prospective meetings6 are activities for which reim-
bursement may be made. By emphasizing the need for securing a quorum, 
one court has also upheld payment of fees to professional proxy solicitors.7 
The justification of these expenditures is put in terms of facilitating proxy 
voting and informing shareholders with respect to the corporate affairs to· 
be decided.8 Earlier New York precedent draws the line at this point, hold-
ing that measures intended primarily to persuade or influence shareholders 
may not be financed by company funds.9 One member of the majority in 
the principal case concurred only because he did not qelieve the propriety 
of specific items10 had been properly challenged11 and apparently agreed 
·with the dissent that only expenditures reasonably related to the informa-
tive function should be all9wed. Thus, the rule of Lawyers' Advertising Co. 
v. Consolidated Railway Lighting and Refrigerating Co.12 continues to be 
the law in New York. Nevertheless, the language of the prevailing opinion 
suggests a much more lenient standard. Reference is made to the need for 
management to "freely answer the challenges of outside groups" and to 
spend in "defense of . . . corporate policies" and for the purpose of "per-
suading the stockholders ... and soliciting their support."13 While recog-
nizing an over-all test of reasonableness, the opinion refers to the problem 
of stockholder indifference in "these days of giant corporations with vast 
numbers of stockholders . . . . "14 Such expressions serve to emphasize 
the observation, first made in the earliest English precedent for manage-
tion, see Latcham and Emerson, "Proxy Contest Expenditure and Shareholder Democracy," 
4 WEST. REs. L. R.Ev. 5 at 9, 10 (1952). • 
4 Peel v. London and North Western Ry. Co., note 3 supra; Hall v. Trans-Lux Day-
light Picture Screen Corp., note 3 supra; Steinberg v. Adams, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 90 F. 
Supp. 604. See also Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., (D.C. Del. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 
649. 
5 Peel v. London and North Western Ry. Co., note 3 supra; Bounds v. Stephenson, 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916) 187 S.W. 1031). 
6 Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Railway Lighting and Refrigerating Co., 
187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907). 
7 In re Zickl, 73. N.Y.S. (2d) 181 (1947). In Steinberg v. Adams, note 4 supra, such 
expenditures were approved without special discussion. 
s See the cases cited in note 4 supra. 
9 Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Railway Lighting and Refrigerating ·eo., 
note 6 supra. For approval of this position, see Latcham and Emerson, "Proxy Contest 
Expenditure and Shareholder Democracy," 4 WEST. REs. L. R.Ev. 5 at 11 (1952). 
10 Included among management's expenses were outlays for chartered aircraft and 
limousines, entertainment, public relations counsel, and professional proxy solicitors. Prin-
cipal case at 295. 
11 None of the judges specifically approved the several expense items. While three 
favored a broader rule than was argued for by the plaintiff, they made it clear that failure 
of the plaintiff to challenge the reasonableness of particular items was fatal to his case. 
The concurring judge limited himself to quoting from Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Con-
solidated Railway Lighting and Refrigerating Co., note 6 supra, which adheres to the 
"information only" rule. 
12 Note 6 supra. 
13 Principal case at 293. 
14 Principal case at 292. 
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ment's use of corporate funds, that the question of what expenses are 
reasonably necessary to get the best expression of shareholder opinion is a 
matter of "opinion and custom."15 It may well be that the liberal view of 
the prevailing opinion as to what is "necessary" to obtain meaningful share-
holder participation is consonant with the increased use of mass communica-
tions media and modern public relations techniques in proxy battles. 
It is apparent that those categories of expenditures which are disap-
proved as not serving a corporate purpose when incurred by m.inagement 
must be disapproved for the same reason when undertaken by the opposi-
tion. However, whether reimbursement is to be allowed the insurgents for 
approved objectives, such as informing the shareholders, depends upon 
whether the non-management status of the insurgents is fatal to their claim 
upon the company treasury. Three judges in the principal case emphasized 
that since the "outs" have no responsibility for operating the company and 
thus do not share management's duty to acquaint the stockholders as to 
corporate matters, payment to them is ultra vires, and can not be approved 
by the stockholders. In the only other precedent for allowing opposition 
reimbursement, the court saw no basis for drawing a distinction between 
the two groups.16 It would seem that the opposition may contribute as 
much to the shareholders' knowledge of the issues in controversy as does 
management. The rule should not favor a one-sided presentation. Granting 
that the insurgents are not under a duty to act, subsequent ratification by 
the corporation may supply authority as to those acts which serve a corpo-
rate purpose.17 Possibly the adoption of the opposition slate would suffice 
to ratify the acts of the insurgents and would justify payment for reasonable 
expenditures.18 A formal resolution affirming reimbursement, apparently 
required by the federal court in Steinberg v. Adams,19 and by the New York 
court in the principal case, is not without significance, however. In the 
15 Peel v. London and North Western Ry. Co., note 3 supra, at 20. 
16 Steinberg v. Adams, note 4 supra, noted in 61 YALE L.J. 229 (1952), and 36 CORN. 
L.Q. 558 (1951). Another recent case on this point is Cullom v. Simmonds, 285 App. Div. 
1051, 139 N.Y.S. (2d) 401 (1955), holding allegations that expenditures were unreasonable 
and that no true policy dispute existed stated a cause of action against newly elected 
directors who reimbursed the expenses of the winning faction. 
In the Steinberg case, Judge Rifkind appealed to the analogy of reimbursement to a 
shareholder who successfully brings a derivative action for the benefit of the corpora-
tion. The analogy applies to successful proxy contestants only if the shareholders' choice 
is taken as conclusive evidence of what is good for the corporation. Perhaps Judge Rifkind 
correctly thought it should be, in view of the practical impossibility of making an in-
dependent finding in this regard. The analogy is criticized by the dissenters in the prin-
cipal case. See also the discussion in 36 CoRN. L.Q. 558 (1951). 
17 2 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. §764 (1954). Talbot v. Harrison, 150 Misc. 798, 270 N.Y.S. 
171 (1932), affd. 240 App. Div. 957, 268 N.Y.S. 875 (1933), illustrates an analogous situa-
tion. Acting outside the scope of his duties, an officer of the company developed a secret 
rubber reclamation process. It was held that royalty payments agreed to by the board 
of directors were not ultra vires and could be ratified by a majority of the shareholders. 
18 Stockholder ratification may take place by a vote at a stockholder meeting or by 
implication through accepting benefits or acquiescing in action taken. Rosehill Ceme-
tery Co. v. Dempster, 223 Ill. 567, 79 N.E. 276 (1906); San Diego v. Pacific Beach Co., 112 
Cal. 53, 44 P. 333 (1896); 2 FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. §764, p. 1109 (1954). 
19 Note 4 supra. 
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usual situation the new directors are personally interested in reimburse-
ment so that specific shareholder approval would affirm what would other-
wise constitute a voidable act.20 
If reimbursement to successful21 insurgents is to be allowed, that part 
of the prevailing opinion which approves of expenditures purely in defense 
of existing policies, as distinguished from informing shareholders or promot-
ing widespread participation, may well be questioned. The prospect for 
recoupment would spur the opposition to greater effort, and if management 
were free to meet opposition publicity, move for move, in its own defense, 
the result would be a public relations arms race financed by the corporate 
treasury. Expenditures by either side which cannot be reasonably related 
to facilitating proxy voting or to stimulating informed shareholder partici-
pation should continue to be subject to challenge by individual stockholders 
on the ground that they do not serve a corporate purpose.22 
Julius B. Poppinga, S. Ed. 
20 Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 207 N.Y. II3, 100 N.E. 721 (1912). Analogously, contracts 
between a corporation and its directors are voidable unless ratified or acquiesced in by the 
stockholders. 3 FLETCHER, Cvc. CoRP. §979 (1947). 
21 For an argument that losing opposition groups should also be financed by the cor-
poration, see Friedman, "Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests," 51 CoL. L. REv. 951 
at 958 et seq. (1951). 
22 The newly adopted revisions of Securities and Exchange Act Regulation X-14 [SEC 
Exchange Act Release Jan. 16, 1956, 21 Fed. Reg. 577 Gan. 26, 1956)] and the hearings on 
corporate proxy contests initiated in 1955 by the Senate Securities Subcommittee [see 
S. Rep. 1306, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955)] suggest increasing concern as to these matters. 
However, neither the SEC revisions nor the bill to which the hearings pertain [S. 879, 
84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955)] deal directly with the question of corporate withdrawals for 
proxy expenditures. For a discussion of previously existing provisions, see Friedman, "SEC 
Regulation of Corporate Proxies," 63 HARv. L. REv. 796 (1950); Bayne, Caplin, Emerson 
and Latcham, "Proxy Regulation and the Rule-Making Process: The 1954 Amendments," 
40 VA. L. REv. 387 (1954). 
